Fucked, but not fucked up
翻译目的仅为语言学习,其他毒副作用概不负责。时间不多的老师们可以只浏览我加粗的部分。
李开复早上在新浪围脖颇具玩味的说:危险所在之处,也生成着拯救。终极的拯救,不是免于失去,而是免于恐惧。
相信会有很多人和我一样,看完之后会对Google的崇敬和信赖有又上升了一个空前的水平。
关于中国的新举动
1/12/2010 03:00:00 PM
和很多大家熟悉的公司一样,我们在基本原则的问题上,遇到了不同程度接连不断的网络攻击。在12月份中期,我们在中国发现目标明确、极其老练的侵犯Google知识产权的行为。但是,我们随后意识到,这个刚开始被视为安全问题的事情,却和我们预料的完全不一样。
首先,这次攻击不只是针对Google,据我们调查发现,涉及了各行各业至少20个大公司,互联网业,金融业,技术业,媒体和化工业都有涉及,而且目标都很相似。我们现在正在和相关企业与美国当局进行联系。
其次,我们有证据显示,此次攻击的主要目标就是中国人权活动家的Gmail账户。截至我们目前的调查显示,攻击的目的并没有达到。只有两个Gmail账户被攻破,而且是仅限于账户信息(如帐号创立日期)和标题,邮件内容则依旧安全。
再次,在仅针对Google的调查当中,我们发现几十个美国、中国、欧洲的宣传人权的Gmail账户在中国是通过第三方应用登录的。这些账户没有任何安全漏洞,很有可能在用户电脑上的流氓软件和钓鱼诈骗进入的。
凭借此次攻击获得的信息,我们已经在基础和构架上为用户安全做出了改进。对于个人用户,我们建议在电脑上安装声誉较好的杀毒软件和反垃圾软件程序,安装操作系统补丁并升级浏览器。并在点击在即时通讯软件和邮件中的链接,填写个人信息和密码的时候提高警惕。你可以在这里查看更多网络安全推荐。大家也可以在这份美国政府报告上查看更多类似网络攻击,同类的还有Nart Villeneuve的博客以及这份GhostNet间谍事件的演示文稿。
我们已经给广大用户就这些攻击的信息发布采取了非常措施,不仅仅是因为涉及的安全和人权问题,也是因为这些信息涉及了全球范围关于言论自由的核心争论。在过去的几十年里,中国经济的发展和和公民企业化精神是的数以百万的中国人民摆脱了贫困。确实,这个大国正处在今日世界经济进发展的核心位置。
我们在2006年发布了Google中国(谷歌),目的是为了中国民众获得更多的信息,并且为了一个更为开放的互联网而不得不同意审查了一些搜索结果。我们当时说的很清楚,“我们密切关注中国的环境,包括新的法案和其它一些限制我们业务的规定,如果我们不能达到计划目标,将会毫不犹豫的退出中国”。
这些毫不掩饰的攻击和监管,不管是去年的攻击,还是将来在网络上关于言论自由的限制,是迫使我们重新考虑我们在中国业务发展的可行性。我们决定将不再审查Google.cn的搜索结果,在接下来的几周里,我们会和中国政府商讨在不违法的情况下如何运营不再过滤的搜索服务。我们知道到这就意味着可能要关闭google.cn,并关闭在中国的办公室。
关于重新考虑我们在中国业务的措施很艰巨,我们也清楚其深远影响。需要声明的是,这是由美国总部的决定,和在中国成就了google.cn的辛勤工作员工没有关系。我们会致力于承担由此引起非常棘手的员工问题。
企业发展和法律事务高级副总裁:David Drummond
需搬梯地址 http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2010/01/new-approach-to-china.html
免翻墙原文如下
A new approach to China
1/12/2010 03:00:00 PMLike many other well-known organizations, we face cyber attacks of varying degrees on a regular basis. In mid-December, we detected a highly sophisticated and targeted attack on our corporate infrastructure originating from China that resulted in the theft of intellectual property from Google. However, it soon became clear that what at first appeared to be solely a security incident–albeit a significant one–was something quite different.
First, this attack was not just on Google. As part of our investigation we have discovered that at least twenty other large companies from a wide range of businesses–including the Internet, finance, technology, media and chemical sectors–have been similarly targeted. We are currently in the process of notifying those companies, and we are also working with the relevant U.S. authorities.
Second, we have evidence to suggest that a primary goal of the attackers was accessing the Gmail accounts of Chinese human rights activists. Based on our investigation to date we believe their attack did not achieve that objective. Only two Gmail accounts appear to have been accessed, and that activity was limited to account information (such as the date the account was created) and subject line, rather than the content of emails themselves.
Third, as part of this investigation but independent of the attack on Google, we have discovered that the accounts of dozens of U.S.-, China- and Europe-based Gmail users who are advocates of human rights in China appear to have been routinely accessed by third parties. These accounts have not been accessed through any security breach at Google, but most likely via phishing scams or malware placed on the users’ computers.
We have already used information gained from this attack to make infrastructure and architectural improvements that enhance security for Google and for our users. In terms of individual users, we would advise people to deploy reputable anti-virus and anti-spyware programs on their computers, to install patches for their operating systems and to update their web browsers. Always be cautious when clicking on links appearing in instant messages and emails, or when asked to share personal information like passwords online. You can read more here about our cyber-security recommendations. People wanting to learn more about these kinds of attacks can read this U.S. government report (PDF), Nart Villeneuve’s blog andthis presentation on the GhostNet spying incident.
We have taken the unusual step of sharing information about these attacks with a broad audience not just because of the security and human rights implications of what we have unearthed, but also because this information goes to the heart of a much bigger global debate about freedom of speech. In the last two decades, China’s economic reform programs and its citizens’ entrepreneurial flair have lifted hundreds of millions of Chinese people out of poverty. Indeed, this great nation is at the heart of much economic progress and development in the world today.
We launched Google.cn in January 2006 in the belief that the benefits of increased access to information for people in China and a more open Internet outweighed our discomfort in agreeing to censor some results. At the time we made clear that “we will carefully monitor conditions in China, including new laws and other restrictions on our services. If we determine that we are unable to achieve the objectives outlined we will not hesitate to reconsider our approach to China.”
These attacks and the surveillance they have uncovered–combined with the attempts over the past year to further limit free speech on the web–have led us to conclude that we should review the feasibility of our business operations in China. We have decided we are no longer willing to continue censoring our results on Google.cn, and so over the next few weeks we will be discussing with the Chinese government the basis on which we could operate an unfiltered search engine within the law, if at all. We recognize that this may well mean having to shut down Google.cn, and potentially our offices in China.
The decision to review our business operations in China has been incredibly hard, and we know that it will have potentially far-reaching consequences. We want to make clear that this move was driven by our executives in the United States, without the knowledge or involvement of our employees in China who have worked incredibly hard to make Google.cn the success it is today. We are committed to working responsibly to resolve the very difficult issues raised.
